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A cursory review of Scahill’s online
postings, blogs, and congressional testi-
mony reveals a clear and evident bias.
But hardly any reasonable military pro-
fessional would argue that the actions
of companies like Blackwater have not
harmed the coalition forces’ counterin-
surgency effort in Iraq. Downstream
and third-order effects of these some-
times reckless and frequently arrogant
mercenaries are not part of the calcula-
tion—they get paid for keeping the
principal alive and unharmed. On the
other hand, Scahill’s rejection of private
security companies as a concept leaves
little room for the possibility that com-
panies like Blackwater could be useful
in the national security apparatus if fu-
ture administrations and Congress
could muster the political will to con-
trol them under an effective and feasi-
ble system of accountability. Moreover,
while there is plenty to condemn about
Blackwater’s legacy, tactics, and man-
agement, that is only half of Scahill’s
story. That Blackwater founder Erik
Prince is a deeply and evidently reli-
gious conservative is prima facie evi-
dence, according to Scahill, that he and
his business is or should be thoroughly
discredited.
Finally, Scahill laments that Blackwater
has been able to recruit seasoned intelli-
gence and operational professionals,
such as Cofer Black, without acknowl-
edging that it is a common practice for
corporations to recruit talent from the
government, and vice versa. He paints
Black, in particular, as a sellout, when
Black’s hiring by Blackwater only fol-
lows the typical pattern of Washington
professionals across many vocations.
Faulting his decision to move to the
private sector is shallow and naive.
The bottom line on Blackwater is that it
is worth reading. The book is a useful
medium to take stock of the myriad is-
sues that confront policy makers on this
controversial subject. Yet Scahill’s an-
tipathy toward all things Bush, Republi-
can, and the Christian right ultimately
takes over. Coupled with untidy organi-
zation and the author’s tendency to re-
peat himself, this renders his work less
constructive and credible than it other-
wise might have been.
R. G. BRACKNELL
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Regimental Judge Advocate,
Regimental Combat Team 5, Al Asad, Iraq
Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness,
and Morality in War. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2008. 300pp. $29.95
Hugo Slim has written a remarkable and
disturbing book that everyone con-
cerned with the safety of “civilians”
should read—and then join the public
debate about protecting them. Slim
states that while the word “civilian” has
long been an ambiguous concept, it is
one we must do more to support be-
cause it is grounded in basic Western
values. He encourages wide public dis-
cussion about defending and expanding
the civilian concept in an age of terror-
ism, failing states, and ethnic strife. He
has fulfilled this purpose admirably, with
a deep and wide breadth of scholarship
that should spark serious debate at all
levels.
This book is remarkable because the au-
thor, who has worked in humanitarian
assistance for more than twenty years,
tells of the horrendous evil that men do
with a dispassionate tone that allows
both the deadly logic of civilian killing
and its terrible results to seep into the
reader’s mind. It is disturbing. This
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reader was taken aback to realize that
rather than build revulsion, the accumu-
lation of damning evidence created the
same “not my job” effect that allows na-
tions to ignore atrocities against whole
peoples.
Slim describes in detail the “seven
spheres of civilian suffering”: direct vio-
lence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and
sexual violence, forced movement, im-
poverishment, famine and disease, emo-
tional suffering, and postwar suffering.
The book’s most disturbing aspect is the
six chapters that describe the painful de-
tails about civilian killing. Only one
chapter is dedicated to promoting civil-
ian protection. This offers practical ex-
pressions of philosopher Howard
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing
human minds as Slim’s answer to the di-
lemma: reason, research, resonance
(emotion and morality), representa-
tional redescription (shared identity), re-
sources and rewards, real world events,
and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions
as to how to apply these levers, such as
international criminal courts, fail to res-
onate with the same passion as the myr-
iad justifications for civilian killing. But
this may be the point: killing results
from the strongest passions, while the
act of sparing life results from the more
enduring, yet more difficult to evoke,
feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.
ROBERT L. PERRY
Naval War College
Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washing-
ton, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt.
Cold War International History Project. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 264pp.
$49.95
Historians are charged with applying
twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents
that, at the time, seem to be only a curi-
ous combination of blurring events.
Charles Gati, a leading commentator on
Central European history and politics,
does just that in Failed Illusions, his
study of the abortive Hungarian Revo-
lution of 1956 against the Soviet Union.
His book was fifty years in the making,
partly because many of his primary
sources have only recently been made
available. Although he was a firsthand
observer of events in Hungary in the
1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure
that it reflected an appropriate level of
objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the
time of the revolution, having recently
been fired from a state-run newspaper
for no ostensible reason. While this
made him sympathetic to the revolu-
tion, he readily admits to a certain
naiveté about why it was happening.
This work is largely a result of his per-
sonal quest to retrospectively under-
stand this seminal event that shaped his
life. He emigrated to the United States
shortly after the revolution.
Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary
and the leader of the revolution, is the
story’s protagonist. Through superb us-
age of primary and personal sources,
Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic
figure. The book’s most profound in-
sights are in its handling of the decision
makers in Moscow and Washington.
Moscow possessed the ultimate power
and was responsible for the decisions
that led to the Soviet invasion of Hun-
gary in November 1956. However,
Gati’s use of recently opened records
proves conclusively that Soviet leader-
ship was not “trigger happy.” It is eye
opening to see just how close the Soviet
politburo came to allowing Hungary to
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